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FREE SPEECH ON THE
INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY:
EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES
by

CAROLINE UYTTENDAELEt & JOSEPH DUMORTIERt

I.

INTRODUCTION

When the creation of the information superhighway was first announced it was expected to expand the freedom of speech worldwide.'
Indeed, users could become their own editors, disseminate information
and give their opinions on a global scale. Free expression, distribution
and reception of information never seemed so complete. However, reality turned out to be slightly different. The current proliferation of global
information networks has prompted governments to regulate communication on these systems. 2 There has been criticism recently about legist Associate Research Fellow, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
t Director of the Interdisciplinary Centre, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
1. See RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN COUNEUROPE AND THE GLOBAL INFORMATION SOCIETY (1994); FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE

CIL:
FORUM INFORMATION SOCIETY TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION: NETWORKS FOR PEOPLE AND
THEIR COMMUNITIES. MAKING THE MOST OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION (1996); RESOLUTION OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, Nov. 21, 1996, 1996 O.J. (C 376)
1 (describing new policy-priorities regarding the information society); Interim Report from
the High Level Expert Group on the Social and Societal Aspects of the Information Society:

Building the European Information Society for Us All (1996). See also Address by Al Gore,
Vice-President of the United States, G7 MinisterialConference on the Information Society
(Feb. 25, 1995) (visited Apr. 30, 1998) <http://www.di.unito.it/mail_archive/G7/0011.html>;
Al Gore, Bringing Information to the World: the Global InformationInfrastructure,9 HARv.
J.L. & TECH. 1 (1996).
2. There have been legislative initiatives in a number of states concerning publicly
available information as authorities are trying to prevent illegal information from circulating through the global information networks. For example, in Saudi-Arabia, Internet-access is restricted to hospitals and universities so that Saudi citizens do not encounter
discussions of a political, religious or erotic nature. China wants all Internet-users to report to the local police station within 30 days. In the United States, the Communications
Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 609 (1996) was meant to protect Americans against illegal and
harmful content. The transition to new media often seems to be a pretext for governments
to enact further restrictions on free speech, as was demonstrated recently by the controversies concerning the Communications Decency Act, which was overturned by the U.S.
Supreme Court. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S.Ct. 2329 (1997). Note that besides this legisla-
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lators' attempts to reduce freedom of speech on the Internet.
The purpose of this article is to analyse from an European point of
view the need for new free speech legislation on the information superhighway. The central question in this respect is twofold: addressing the
need for additional measures protecting free speech, and the relevance of
existing restrictions on free speech. Now that complete freedom of
speech can be obtained, at least theoretically, public authorities do not
seem to hold it sacred, though, in truth, it has never been absolute. It
had to be limited from the beginning for two reasons. Firstly, speech
harming public order and the subjective rights of other people was prohibited. This undemocratic speech - expressions offending public decency or public security - was forbidden, as were slander and libel.
Secondly, European legislators were convinced that they had to ensure
the diversity of media content, because it was endangered by frequency
scarcity and the threat of media concentrations which would keep diversity at a minimum.
How far can, or should, governments go in safeguarding or restricting free speech on the information superhighway?
Before developing any new free speech legislation for information
superhighway purposes, it is important to outline the objectives that are
achieved by the freedom of speech principle. This analysis will reveal
that the role of free speech does not change because it is applied to different media. Free speech objectives are carrier-independent, and therefore, should be fully applicable to the information superhighway. 3 There
is no reason for this principle to be affected by the emergence of new
devices for the dissemination of information. 4 In general, the success of
information technology does not give rise to new legal questions or categorisations. Familiar legal problems are just seen in a new light,
changing the scale or pattern of existing human affairs or providing new
areas for applying old principles. 5 Using the right analogies, the application concerning public information, private communication on the information superhighway has been regulated by way of various rules concerning digital signatures, privacy
issues, encryption techniques, etc.
3. The enforcement of current free speech restrictions in this context may be quite
complicated, given the international character of the modern communications networks
and the relative ease with which anonymous messages can be sent. Restraints on free
speech on the information superhighway which are superfluous should be abolished.
4. The law should survive technical progress. See STANLEY FISH, THERE'S NO SUCH
THING AS FREE SPEECH 23 (1994). "The law does not remain what it is because its every
detail survives the passing of time, but because in the wake of change, society still looks to
it for the performance of a particular task." Id.
5. See Cass R. Sunstein, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1757,
1765 (1995). See also MARSHALL McLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF

MAN 8 (1965). The railway system analogy is interesting in this regard: "The railway did
not introduce movement or transportation or wheel or road into human society, but it accel-
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tion of free speech rules to the information superhighway can begin by
6
building on the traditional legal categories and constitutional concepts.
For the purposes of this article and in order to analyse whether legislative measures need to be adopted or abolished for safeguarding free
speech on the information superhighway, we will divide current European free speech legislation into three main parts: current protection of
free speech, the prohibition of undemocratic speech and the safeguarding
of diversity. First, the exact scope of the concepts of "free speech" and
"information superhighway" are delimited in an introductory section.
Second, the original motives grounding each part of free speech legislation will be examined. The arguments evolving from this analysis will be
assessed in the light of the information superhighway in order to determine their relevance in this context. What do we expect from free speech
regulations on the information superhighway? Using the answer to this
question as a starting point, the need for further government intervention will be studied for each part of free speech legislation.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY

The information superhighway is a metaphor for representing the
convergence of formerly separate communications means into one unique
infrastructure. It is the medium that should fulfill at one stroke a
number of human communication needs. Its digital infrastructure is
said to be soon available in every home, delivering a variety of information services: electronic newspapers, radio and television programmes
and video games, as well as telephone, fax and e-mail services.
It should be noted that the idea of the information superhighway
has different connotations in the United States and in Europe. 7 In the
United States, the concept mainly relates to the growing economic interest in information.8 Over one-half of employees in the U.S. work in inforerated and enlarged the scale of previous human functions, creating totally new kinds of
cities and new kinds of work and leisure." Id.
6. See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1765.
7. See Emmanuel Crabit & Jean Bergevin, Le cadre rdglementaire des services de la
socidtd de l'information:Laboratoirepour un nouveau droit du marchd intdrieur?, 1995 REv.
MARCH9 UNIQUE EuR.

15, 18.

8. See Al Gore, Networking the Future:We Need a National "Superhighway"for Computer Information,WASH. POST, July 15, 1990, at B3. The American regulation of the information superhighway started with a 1991 report of the National Telecommunications and
Information Agency (NTIA) (visited Apr. 16, 1998) <httpJ/www.ntia.doc.gov/>. See also
THE NTIA INFRASTRUCTURE, TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE AGE OF INFORMATION (1991).
Consequently, the then senator, Al Gore, launched the idea of a "National Information Infrastructure," a "seamless web of communications networks, computers, databases, and
consumer electronics that will put vast amounts of information at users' fingertips." WHITE
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mation-based jobs, 9 and the information technology sector is of strategic
importance. Hence, the words "information superhighway," referring to
the technical aspects of the information society, are more frequently used
than the words "information society." Conversely, in Europe, the emphasis lies more on the "information society," associated with the general
economic and societal changes occurring as a result of the progress in
information and communications technology. 10 As citizen's attitudes towards knowledge and information are quickly changing, Europe will be
transformed into a new type of society.1 '
The European Union (EU) 12 has given an important impetus to the
information superhighway through its policies of liberalisation and financial support. 13 Still, notwithstanding political declarations and efforts, the European information superhighway is relatively undeveloped.
Access is limited to major corporations, public institutions and educational organisations. Few residential users are currently connected. In
the long term however, the information superhighway should evolve into
a fully interactive universal medium, combining public and private communication functions. It will then be used for private messages like telephone calls, fax and e-mail. In the meantime, it carries all kinds of
public information, available on demand for free or against due payment:
electronic newspapers, databases, radio and television programmes,
video games, etc. All .of this information will circulate through the
HOUSE, NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE AGENDA FOR ACTION, Sept. 15, 1993. In
January, 1994, a white paper was published in order to define the envisaged information
policy. See WHITE HOUSE, ADMINISTRATION WHITE PAPER ON COMMUNICATIONS ACT RE-

FORMS (1994), available in 1994 WL 3823874. The rhetoric advocating the information superhighway is highly euphoric. Besides the beneficial effects on free speech also mentioned
are: cultural enrichment, democratic promotion, increasing policy participation of citizens,
support of general welfare and potential economic growth. See Address by Al Gore, VicePresident of the United States, G7 MinisterialConference on the Information Society (Feb.
25, 1995), supra note 1.
9. See Fred H. Cate, The FirstAmendment and the NationalInformation Infrastructure, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 5 (1995).
10. The information society comprises a great amount of knowledge, to which all states
and cultures are contributing. A gap between the information-rich and the informationpoor must be avoided at all cost. The successful elaboration of the information society is
considered to be crucial for the future of Europe in the 21st century. See GROWTH, COMPETITIVENESS, EMPLOYMENT - THE CHALLENGES AND WAYS FORWARD INTO THE 21ST CENTURY:

White Paper, COM (93)700 final.
11.

RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL:

EUROPE AND THE GLOBAL INFORMATION SOCIETY (1994). "This revolution will change the
way we work together and live together." Id.

12. For consolidated texts of the European Community law currently in force, Treaties
and recent rulings by the Court of Justice, see European Union Law Web-site (visited Apr.
30, 1996) <http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex>.
13. See Hans Schoof & Adam W. Brown, Information Superhighways and Media Policies in the European Union, 19 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY 325, 338 (1995).
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unique carrier that is the information superhighway. Unfortunately,
this fully integrated information superhighway is not yet reality. We are
now going through a transition period during which the telephone, radio,
television, personal computer and their respective carriers and terminals
co-exist.
The information superhighway is still in its infancy. Nevertheless,
its foundations are already visible, in particular through the growing expansion of the Internet. 14 The Internet is actually the best known illustration of the emerging information superhighway. Originally the
Internet was only available to the military and universities, it is now
rapidly expanding through public access points in libraries, schools and
cyber-cafes. Internet users can disseminate and receive information and
ideas on a worldwide scale. Most governments have realized by now that
the Internet has become a powerful medium and they have started to
subject it to regulation that may possibly find application later on to
other information superhighway services. In this sense, the Internet is a
true testing ground for regulating the information superhighway.

B.

THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH

Before demarcating its scope on the information superhighway, we
must define what is meant exactly by "freedom of speech. 15 Generally,
the principle is understood as the freedom of every human expression
intended for public communication. This signifies that speech, even
speech that causes some measure of harm to the public, is entitled to a
16
special degree of immunity from government restraint.
Freedom of speech is a media-independent principle. It originated in
14. Patrick G. Crago, FundamentalRights on the Infobahn: Regulating the Delivery of
Internet Related Services Within the European Community, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.

REV. 467, 474 (1997). The Internet is a world-wide amalgamation of computer networks,
connected by a common communications protocol, Transmission Control Protocol/Internet
Protocol (TCP/IP). Id.
15. Various definitions of free speech have been formulated down through the years,
depending on the circumstances of time and place. A traditional definition is the one
Madison states: that the ability to transmit information through one's own person (free
speech) or through the use of other material property (free press) needs special protection
from government interference. See John 0. McGinnis, The Once and Future PropertyBased Vision of the FirstAmendment, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 49, 56-57 (1996). Later on, the
concept was understood as being a social instrument in function of the democratic process:
"The First Amendment does not protect a 'freedom to speak.' It protects the freedom of
those activities of thought and communication by which we 'govern.'" Alexander
Meiklejohn, The FirstAmendment is an Absolute, 1961 S. CT. REV 245, 255. In Europe, the
right to freedom of expression is interpreted as the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.
16. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 7-8 (1982).
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a printing press environment 17 and was elaborated on later for the purposes of radio and television.' 8 Free speech clauses developed more or
less simultaneously in the United States and Europe. The First Amendment to the American Constitution was adopted in 1791. Its significance
evolved gradually through numerous Supreme Court interpretations. 19
In Europe, the idea of free speech was first suggested during the second
half of the eighteenth century as a response to practices of a priori censorship during the Ancien R6gime. 20 European freedom of speech theories were closely related to the ideas of enlightenment, natural law and
philosophical liberalism. Officially, they were enacted for the first time
in Article 11 of the "D6claration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen" of
1789.21 During the second half of the nineteenth century, freedom of
speech was promoted by western European legislators as a principle of
constitutional value, being a component of emerging liberalism and
democracy.
The struggle for freedom of speech was, from the beginning, embodied in a struggle for a free press. 2 2 The concept of a free press has the
advantage of indicating some of the economic implications of the freedom
of speech, especially now that information transmission is increasingly
17. McGinnis, supra note 15, at 91. He remarks that at that time the press was the
(only) medium for publishing thoughts to a wide audience, whereas today, computer networks are fast becoming the most cost-effective way of delivering information. Id. at 100.
See ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 21 (1983), mentioning that "in the
total flow of media delivered information, the relative part carried by newspapers,
magazines and books has dropped from being virtually all of it to being only 18 percent of
the words to which people expose themselves." Id.
18. Broadcasting was subjected to specific free speech rules. See generally Thomas G.
Krattenmaker & Lucas A. Powe, Jr., Converging FirstAmendment Principlesfor Converging Communications Media, 104 YALE L.J. 1719, 1721 (1995). See also Andreas Kohl, The
InternationalAspects of the Freedom of Expression in Radio and Television, 8 REv. DR. H.
129 (1975); M. BOLLINGER, Report on Freedom of Expression and Information:An Essential
Element of Democracy, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTH INTERNATIONAL COLLOQUY ABOUT THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 44, 86-126 (1985).

19. These Supreme Court interpretations resulted in, among other things, a ban on
prior restraint, in strict procedural requirements for the regulation of speech and in a presumption against such restrictions. See also DE SOLA POOL, supra note 17, at 55-74.
20. See

HENRI BLIN, ALBERT CHAvANNE

& ROLAND DRAGO,

TRAIT9 DU DROIT DE LA

PRESSE 4 (1969).

21. "La libre communication des pensdes et des opinions est un des droits les plus
prdcieux de l'homme; tout citoyen peut donc parler, 6crire, imprimer librement, sauf A r6pondre de l'abus de cette libert; dans les cas d~termin~s par la loi."
22. See McGinnis, supra note 15, at 92-93. See also ERIC BARENDT, FREEDOM OF
SPEECH 67-77 (1985) (describing the relationship between free speech and the free press).
Note that a free press did not mean a press free from all regulation, but only freedom from
special rules not generally applicable to all enterprises. Only rules of the kind that were
applied to other business enterprises could be applied to the press.
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considered an economic activity. 23 It would be erroneous, however, to
equate a free press exclusively with this component. 2 4 More interesting
is the perception of a free press as the combination of freedom of speech
and freedom of enterprise. Both freedoms should be interpreted as negative freedoms against the state. The institutional press enjoys the same
25
liberties under the free speech provision as the individual.
The continental European tradition of statute law has resulted in
the concept of free speech being strongly incorporated in the text of national constitutions. Statutory laws guarantee the freedom to express
one's opinion on every matter, except that one can be punished for
abuses to this freedom. The principle is sometimes repeated more specif26
ically for the press, resulting in favorable regimes for press offenses.
Besides the relevant constitutional provisions, a rich protection of the
most diverse expressions of the human spirit is safeguarded on the inter27
national as well as on the regional level.
23. McGinnis, supra note 15, at 55. "Information is more than ever seen as a product
to be exchanged, formally and informally, and as a prime source of wealth in society ....
Expressive man is economic man." Id. Free speech undeniably has an important economic
component, requiring the state to remove all barriers to the free circulation of goods, including opinions. See Libois, Vers une approche "communautaire"de la libertg de la presse,
in LES M8DIAS ENTRE DROIT ET POUVOIR 36-37 (B. Libois & G. Haarscher eds. 1995).
24. In this respect, the freedom of enterprise has been misused by economical powers
obstructing free speech rights of other market players.
25. Special rules for the press, including certain immunities, often seem to consist
merely of the application to the press of general free speech principles. The European
Court of Human Rights has stated that the principles applicable to the freedom of expression are of particular importance to the press, as a purveyor of information and public
watchdog. See Federal Republic of Germany v. Barthold, 90 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 4
(1985). See also BARENDT, supra note 22, at 81-83; Sunday Times case, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) at 40 (1979); Austria v. Lingens, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 12 (1986). Note that
according to the European tradition, journalists prefer to see their freedom to speak freely
and to criticise government as being based on their position as ordinary citizens who simply
happen to have access to the media, rather than being based on special constitutional protection. See Thomas Gibbons, Journalistic Freedom and Human Rights, in LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF THE FUNCTIONING OF MEDIA IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

9, 11 (Council of Eu-

rope ed. 1995).
26. See BERND HOLZNAGEL, RUNDFUNKRECHT IN EUROPA (1996).
27. The most important international provisions in this respect are to be found in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, accepted and proclaimed by Resolution 217A (III) of the General Assembly of Dec. 10, 1948: "Everyone has the right to
freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without
interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and
regardless of frontiers." Id. See also Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, adopted and opened for signature, ratification and acession by Resolution
2200 A (XXI) of the General Assembly of December 16, 1966. Entry into force: March 23,
1976:
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless
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The freedom of speech is a compound freedom. It consists of the
freedom to foster an opinion, the freedom to impart it, the freedom to
distribute and transmit information or ideas and the freedom to receive
them, 28 all free from state interference. 29 As such, the freedom of speech
evolved from being just a freedom of distribution to a complete freedom
of communication, extending from the origin of the message up to its final destination. 30 Various interpretations of free speech are possible. In
the United States, a narrow conception requires the state to refrain from
interference with individual expression. In Europe, however, a broader
interpretation prevails, based on the idea that the state should prevent-through active intervention if necessary-communication from being dominated by particular concentrations of power. 3 1 A parallel
distinction is made between the "negative" freedom of speech (the liberty
to speak and write, free from state control and regulation) and the "positive" freedom (the demand for the provision by the state of speech facili32
ties or even of a positive regulatory framework).
The freedom implies negative as well as positive state obligations in
Europe. In principle, governments should not interfere with rights of
of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any
other media of his choice.
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this Article carries
with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain
restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:
(a) For the respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of
public health or morals.
Id.
28. The freedom of reception has been explicitly recognized by the European Court of
Human Rights, Sunday Times, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 40 (1979).
29. Note that the German constitution distinguishes three slightly different components to free speech: the freedom of opinion, the right to inform oneself and the freedom of
the media. See BERND HOLZNAGEL, The ConstitutionalProtectionof Freedom ofExpression,
in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE FUNCTIONING OF MEDIA IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

75, 76 (Coun-

cil of Europe ed. 1995).
30. See GPRARD COHEN-JONATHAN, LA CONVENTION EUROPPENNE DES DROITS DE
L'HoMME 451 (1989). The three components of free speech are clearly revealed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR),
and by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Note that the three partial freedoms make an ideal combination together but that they may just as well exist
individually. It is not so long ago since the freedom of reception was for example well established in most western European countries, without there being any freedom of transmission under the monopoly of public broadcasting organizations.
31. Gibbons, supra note 25, at 12. He states: "the broader conception of freedom of
communication, however, implies plurality of information, a multiplicity of voices which
encourages a diversity of expression." Id. at 18.
32. BARENDT, supra note 22, at 78. This distinction seems to be typical for Europe. Id.
See also Holznagel, supra note 29, at 83-84. Holznagel calls this the basic right's "subjective" and "objective" side. Id.
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free speech, though this abstention duty is not absolute. Freedom of
speech may be subjected to restrictions. 33 Legitimate interferences with
free speech derive from the prevention of undemocratic speech (harmful
to the public order or to private interests) or from the need to preserve
diversity. 34 Hence, free speech implies a positive duty of care for public
authorities to secure an adequate protection of this freedom. This idea is
related to the general evolution of the "socializing" of human rights and
freedoms in Europe. 35 The duty of care is based on Article 1 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms ("ECHR"), 3 6 requiring the state to "secure" the Convention
rights to everyone within it's jurisdiction. In certain cases it may indeed
be necessary for the state to take positive action with a view to effectively
guaranteeing these rights. 3 7 In the field of free speech, the duty of care
has been recognized by the European Court of Human Rights, at least in
38
the abstract.
33.

COUNCIL OF EUROPE STEERING COMMITTEE ON

THE MASS MEDIA:

CONSULTANT

STUDY ON THE IMPACT OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIC VALUES,

13

CDMM(95):
While freedom is in itself inapplicable because of its absolute nature, society has to
define the conditions for making it operational, in other words for its implementation. This definition, which outlines and limits the freedom, results from striking
a balance between rights and freedoms, sometimes complementary, sometimes
competing, in the general interest. But this definition is also likely to evolve, given
that it is associated with a given state of society.
Id.
Exceptions to free speech rights are not encoded in the First Amendment. Instead, they
are to be found in the doctrine of the Supreme Court defining the extent of free speech
protection. The European framework for government restrictions to free speech is enacted
in Article 10, para. 2 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms.
34. See HOLZNAGEL, supra note 29, at 87. The latter are treated separately as part of
the duty of care.
35. This relates to the evolution from a liberal, individual and classic freedom/right to
a social and cultural right. See Dirk Voorhoof, CriticalPerspectives on the Scope and Interpretationof Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 10 Council of Europe
Mass Media Files, 57 (1995). But see BARENDT, supra note 22, at 79-80, referring to the
analysis of Hohfeld who categorises all legal relationships into the correlations right-duty,
liberty-no right, power-liability and immunity-disability. Since the freedom of speech is
only a liberty, the state has no right to intervene. But nobody has a duty to listen, nor is
the state under a duty to provide facilities for speech. Id.
36. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome, Nov. 4, 1950.
37. Rommelfanger v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 12242/86, 62 Eur.
Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 151 (1989).
38. See Nederlandse Omroepprogramma Stichting v. The Netherlands, App. No.
13920/88, 71 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 126 (1991) (with respect to other fundamental
rights and freedoms). The Court has effectively stressed that the Convention imposes positive obligations on states to safeguard rights, and not merely to refrain from interference.
See also Belgium v. Marckx, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15 (1979), in respect of privacy

914

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XVI

Both aspects of this double state duty, to allow activism while using
restraint when necessary, serve the common goal of facilitating autonomous communication by private individuals. 3 9 They extend to all media,
including the information superhighway, and in particular, the Internet.
All government interference with free speech is embodied in media law
40
or communications law.
The information superhighway may still be under construction, but
the Internet is already operational and rapidly expanding. European
countries try to stay in control of Internet content, but are highly criticized by human rights groups for "illegally" interfering with free speech
rights. In order to find out if the information superhighway-as an
emerging new medium-is entitled to full free speech protection, an
analysis of current free speech legislation is required. This study will be
limited to the European context. The actual protection of free speech is
studied in the first section, followed by a discussion of the restraints on
undemocratic speech and finally the preservation of diversity. The original reasons for the current free speech legislation are analysed in each
section, before any argument concerning the amendment of these rules is
developed. The purpose is to find out exactly which objectives are to be
achieved by free speech legislation. As such, these reasons have not
changed with the introduction of new media, and there is no reason to
believe that they will be any different for the information superhighway.
It is nevertheless important to keep the original reasons in mind, as they
should be the starting point for determining the future role of free speech
under Article 8; Austria v. Plattform Arzte fuir das Leben, 139 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 4
(1988), in respect of peaceful assembly under Article 11; BOLLINGER, supra note 18, at 6480. The same idea was accepted by the United States Supreme Court. See Associated
Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). For the most important Council of Europe policy
documents containing arguments for positive state action with regard to freedom of expression, see Voorhoof, supra note 35, at 56-57.
39.

See DE SOLA POOL, supra note 17, at 18.

40. Note that such particular communication legislation often serves a series of alternative policy goals: reinforcement of national sovereignty and cultural identity, universal
access at reasonable cost, competition in facilities, products and services, etc. The presentation of these communication policy initiatives may mask industrial policy interests,
thereby increasing the vulnerability of the public's primary interest as embodied in the
funding justifying grounds for free speech. The public's primary interest may be the continued existence of the community from which it is derived, according to Shawn W. Yerxa &
Marita Moll, Commodification,Communication, and Culture:Democracy's Dead End on the
Infobahn, 16 MEDIA LAW AND PRACTICE 132, 133 (1995). Governments seem to have the
tendency to use media regulations to disguise policy action in other fields, for example,
employment or national competition policy. It seems to be a recurring phenomenon that
new regulations, presented and defended as helping viewers and customers, are in fact a
product of private self-interest, and often not good for the public at all. Industry often
seeks government help in the marketplace, invoking public spirit justifications for self-interest ends. See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1767.
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legislation on the information superhighway. The adoption or abolition
of legal rules should always be seen in the light of the original reasons
for these rules.
III.
A.

ANALYSIS

PROTECTION OF FREE SPEECH

Speech may have to be restricted for democratic reasons or in order
to secure the diversity of media content. However, the starting point of
any communication or media legislation is the fundamental right of freedom of speech. This should be no different for the information superhighway. The application of free speech rights to the information
superhighway involves an important process of constitutional interpretation. We will determine why European governments started protecting
free speech and analyse whether the original philosophical and political
reasoning behind fundamental rights can be interpreted in light of this
new technology. 4 1 In this section, we inquire if there is still a need for
free speech protection on the information superhighway, and if so, what
the appropriate legislation should consist of.
B.

BACKGROUND TO FREE SPEECH PROTECTION

Free speech is an evolutionary and dynamic concept. It has been
subject to various interpretations depending on the prevailing ideology
in a given time and place. Three main philosophical theories have been
invoked in support of free speech rights: the argument from truth, the
natural rights theory and the argument from democracy. 4 2 We will see,
however, that the last theory, the argument from democracy, is the only
legitimate one.
The argument from truth was soon discovered to be inappropriate
for supporting a free speech principle. Defenders of this idea were convinced that free speech was a necessary instrument for discovering divine truth.43 However, there are many examples of speech, the truth of
41. Note however that their judicial value for enforcing free speech rights on the information superhighway is not unlimited. Legal arguments of a historical and institutional
nature also have a role to play in the constitutional interpretation of free speech rights. See
BARENDT, supra note 22, at 2.
42. See generally Kuibler, The Protection of Human Dignity and Privacy under Media
Law, in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE FUNCTIONING OF MEDIA IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 89, 9091 (Council of Europe ed. 1995) (describing this evolution in a European context).
43. Note that this philosophical underpinning of the freedom of speech was less studied and developed in Europe than in the United States. See generally J.S. MILL, ON LiBERTY, (David Spitz ed., W. W. Norton & Company 1975); JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: A
SPEECH FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED PRINTING

(1644) (Douglas Bush ed., Penquin

Books 1977). According to these theories, forms of speech not useful to the discovery of
truth should be suppressed. Once the goal of divine truth is reached, the liberty can be
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which cannot objectively be tested, such as pornography. Moreover, the
publication of true statements may sometimes be more harmful than
beneficial to society, e.g. in the case of military or industrial secrets. It is
also unlikely that the possibilities for free speech on the information superhighway will bring us any closer to the truth.
Equally inappropriate is the related argument that all truth is relative and that ideas can only be judged in the competition of the marketplace .4 The free marketplace of ideas is a metaphor representing a
forum for public discussion where citizens meet as equals, no idea is suppressed and all viewpoints are heard. It is hard to imagine what a wellfunctioning marketplace of ideas would look like in practice. 45 The Internet may bear some resemblance to it, but even on the Internet not all
ideas or all users are treated equally. The "real" speech market needs to
be regulated to have speech effectively communicated, if only to prevent
simultaneous speech on the street, in public meetings, or on the airwaves. 46 Hence, the marketplace of ideas is no more free than any other
"free market."
The argument from natural rights is also an inadequate basis on
which to ground free speech rights. This concept considers free speech to
be a natural, exclusive right of the citizen, being an integral aspect of
discarded altogether. The argument rests on the assumption that the truth of certain beliefs can be determined in the long run, or at least that it is possible to distinguish more or
less between truth and falsehood. Interesting in this respect is SCHAUER, supra note 16, at
25: "allowing the expression of contrary views is the only rational way of recognising
human fallibility, and making possible the rejection or modification of those of our beliefs
that are erroneous." Id. Prohibition of speech which might be true is undesirable, since the
opponents of government measures should be free to challenge these measures. Government can then be confident that its policies are right and that it is appropriate to legislate.
See Mill, supra note 43, at 81. False speech should not be suppressed either, because then
people holding true beliefs would not be challenged any longer or forced to defend their
views. See also BARENDT, supra note 22, at 9-14 (enumerating the most important criticisms to this 'argument from truth').
44. SCHAUER, supra note 16, at 15. "The best test of truth is the power of the thought
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market. .. ." citing Judge Holmes, in Abrams
v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630-1 (1919). Id.
45. R. Randall Rainey & William Rehg, The Marketplace of Ideas, the Public Interest,
and Federal Regulation of the Electronic Media: Implications of Habermas'Theory of Democracy, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1923, 1937 (1996) (explaining that this theory assumes that
commercial market forces are ideologically neutral, that the marketplace of ideas is open to
diverse and controversial issues, that the increase in the number of sources will provide by
itself an increase in viewpoint diversity and that an unregulated telecommunications market will respond most effectively to the public's desire for public affairs information).
46. DE SOLA POOL, supra note 17, at 143. "A market is not something that happens by
itself. It is something crafted by laws; without them it cannot exist." Id. See also Rainey &
Rehg, supra note 45, at 1942 (stating that the communications marketplace is unambiguously a creature of the state).
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each individual's right to self-development and fulfillment. 4 7 However,
other fundamental rights, like the freedom of association or the freedom
of religion also contribute to an individual's right to self-development
and fulfillment.As Moreover, it still needs to be proven that the participation in an Internet newsgroup concerning, for example, neo-nazism or
child pornography, can be qualified as an integral aspect of an individual's right to self-development and fulfillment.
The only suitable ground for a contemporary free speech theory is
the argument from democracy. Free speech should be protected, in
newspapers, on radio, television, and on the information superhighway,
in so far as it contributes to genuine democracy. The democratic aim of
49
free speech has been explicitly recognised by the Council of Europe.
Democracy represents the ultimate procedural attempt to joint decisionmaking. The idea is that universal participation through reflective and
deliberative debate about possible courses of action should guarantee the
welfare of all. 50 The decisive criterion for true democracy therefore is
the freedom to oppose decisions of the majority and to work towards a
51
change in the majority opinion.
47. BARENDT, supra note 22, at 14-20. Note that freedom of speech was also referred to
as being an aspect of the individual's property right to his information. See McGinnis,
supra note 15, at 64-65 (analysing the link between Lockean principles of property and the
freedom of speech, and stating that Madison himself understood freedom of speech as an
inherent property right of individuals).
48. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 266-78 (1977) (pointing to the

natural right to "human dignity and equality of concern and respect," not distinguishing
freedom of speech from other fundamental rights). See also BARENDT, supra note 22, at 16
(remarking that unlimited freedom may well be contrary to the respect for human dignity,
hence the restrictions imposed by libel and obscenity laws).
49. EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON TRANSFRONTIER TELEVISION, March 15, 1989, preamble:

"Itihe freedom of expression and information, as embodied in Article 10 of the ECHR, constitutes one of the essential principles in a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and for the progress of every human being." Id.
50. Democracy does not equal self-determination, rather co-determination. Many authors while elaborating on self-regulation are in fact referring to this concept of co-regulation, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1762.
51. Note that in the democratic tradition, the power of government should be limited,
and since the communication of ideas is crucial to that power, government control over
communication should also be limited. This is especially relevant in the new democracies
of Eastern Europe. See Gibbons, supra note 25, at 10. Free speech can threaten the interests of the state's rulers more immediately and more substantially than, for example, material production. Therefore, rulers have a greater incentive to suppress and regulate these
rights, so special protection from government interference is needed. This even holds for
true democracy. See also Jorg P. Muller, FundamentalRights in Democracy, 4 HuM. RTS.
L. J. 131, 134 (1983); stating that even in a democracy, "the majority decides for everybody,
i.e. for the minority." Id. Hence, the majority is capable of oppressing minorities by reducing their freedom of expression. Fundamental rights impose the necessary restrictions to
unlimited democracy. They take precedence over majority decisions and overrule them.
Id. at 134-35.
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Freedom of speech is an indispensable component of democracy-no
democracy can exist without free speech. Careful study of the free
speech doctrine reveals that the legislator and jurisprudence are not so
much protecting the expressions themselves, as their underlying philosophy: the western democratic ideal. 52 It is that aim that needs protection,
not the expressions contributing to that aim. 53 The best illustration of
this is the fact that expressions undermining the democratic ideal, for
example, racist or hate speech, are not free at all. Free speech turns out
to be merely an instrument, a helpful tool for reaching some higher democratic aspiration, existing only to achieve that purpose.
Free speech serves the democratic interests of all citizens, both
speakers and recipients. 54 The speaker's interest in free speech is
closely linked with his fundamental right to self-development. It lies in
the ability to bring ideas and propositions to the attention of a wide audience, and more importantly, in the power to criticise and ultimately vote
out the government. 55 In the recipient's point of view, the most fundamental interest in protecting free speech is the need to be informed. 56
Democratic decision making requires a certain degree of information be
made available, so that citizen's are exposed to all representative views
in society. 5 7 This exposure allows people to decide for themselves what
52. This underlying objective may vary from the protection of democracy to the promotion of individual self-development, the uplifting of the human being or the progress of
humanity. All the values underlying free speech theories are incontestably important, but
putting the emphasis on one of them would manipulate the actual implementation of free
speech rights in another direction. The democracy rationale is the most cited in Western
Europe and the United States.
53. FISH, supra note 4, at 112. In this respect, some instrumentalists even claim that
the free speech principle does not exist. "Free speech principles don't exist, except as a
component in a bad argument in which such principles are invoked to mask motives that
would not withstand close scrutiny." Id.
54. The protected activities of the communicator include the expression and dissemination of opinions. The freedom of reception has been explicitly recognised by the European Court of Human Rights, See Sunday Times, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 40 (1979). See
also BARmNDT, supra note 22, at 81-83.
55. McGinnis, supra note 15, at 50. See also BARENDT, supra note 22, at 83 (relating
free speech to the right to equality) "all people should have equal opportunities to present
their views, free speech should not be the privilege of the rich and powerful." Id. He further states that there can be no real free speech without the "recognition of claim-rights for
persons wishing to speak and ... corresponding duties to afford them facilities and grant
them equal opportunities for the exercise of these rights." Id.
56. Miller, supra note 51, at 133. See also Rainey & Rehg, supra note 45, at 1930.
There should be substantial control by as many as possible over the process of political
decision-making. Id.
57. BARENDT, supra note 22, at 22. The freedom to receive is explicitly covered in Article 10, ECHR. The Parliamentary Assembly confirmed this in Recommendation 854 of
February 1, 1979: "Parliamentary democracy can function adequately only if the people in
general, and their elected representatives, are fully informed." Id. In the United States,
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is right and what is wrong.
It is clear that a good reason for protecting free speech is the preservation and promotion of western democracies. This original underlying
philosophy of the right to free speech remains relevant to the information superhighway. Free speech should be safeguarded on an independent media basis. The next question is whether there is a need for
additional legislation to protect free speech on the information superhighway or whether the current rules are sufficient for that purpose.
C.

LEGAL INSTRUMENTS PROTECTING FREE SPEECH

Originally, freedom of expression was formulated as a protection
against oppression by the government. Historically, the government and
its authorities were seen as the main threat to free speech. 58 Merchants
exploiting a free press had to protect it against state intervention. For
them, the best press law was no press law. 5 9 This duty of non-interference is still the main starting-point of all free speech legislation. It is
emphasized in national as well as international legal texts, even if it is
not absolute. The number of exceptions has grown with the introduction
of each new medium.
The European model for the protection of fundamental human rights
is based on the existence of two distinct legal orders, namely: the legal
order of the European Union ("EU")60 and the legal order established by
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("ECHR") within the Council of Europe. 6 1 The inrecipients' interests are frequently taken into account in interpreting the First Amendment. Id. at 81.
58. See McGinnis, supra note 15, at 57; stating in this respect that the "function of
(free speech) the First Amendment is to prohibit regulation of an important [property] right
threatened by the government." Id.
59. Voorhoof, supra note 35, at 54. "[T]he best press law is no press law; the best
government interference is no interference; the best State intervention with regard to the
freedom of expression and information is no State intervention." Id.
60. The European Union is a political and economic transnational organisation of European countries, characterized by a distribution of lawmaking powers between the Union
and the Member States. Its legislative branch is composed of the European Commission,
the European Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. The European Court of
Justice is responsible for interpreting EU law and for resolving disputes concerning the
interpretation of Community Treaties. See generally P. KENT, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION 10-88 (1996); P.S.R.F. MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN UNION LAW (1995) and
CHRISTOPHER HARDING & ANN SHERLOCK, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW

(1995).

61. Koen Lenaerts, FundamentalRights to be Included in a Community Catalogue, 16
EuR. L. REV. 367, 371-372 (1991). This legal order has essentially a supervisory role, controlling the way in which member states comply with their ECHR obligations, but exercising no normative powers of its own. Id. See also Dirk Voorhoof, The Media in a Democratic
Society, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE FUNCTIONING OF MEDIA IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 40-41
(Council of Europe ed. 1995) (describing the procedure in case of violation of the Conven-
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volvement of the Council of Europe and the EU with the industries of
62
print and electronic media is fundamentally different in character.
The aim of the Treaty of Rome 6 3 was to establish a common market for
goods and services, including broadcasting services. The Council of Europe on the other hand, by way of the ECHR, aims to guarantee the free
flow of information, as a prerequisite to an open, democratic society. The
EU as such is not a party to the ECHR. Still, the ECHR has an effect
within the legal order of the EU. 64 Fundamental rights including those
guaranteed by the ECHR are an integral part of the general principles of
law, the observance of which is ensured by the European Court of Justice. 65 Hence, EU legislation on broadcasting, cable distribution or online services must ensure freedom of speech.
tion by Member States). Still, the ECHR is a binding instrument for legislators of the
Member States, as was explicitly confirmed in Article 1 of the Convention: "The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms
defined in Section I of this Convention." Supervision of the application of the ECHR is the
responsibility of the organs of the European Convention: the European Commission of
Human Rights, the Committee of Ministers and the European Court of Human Rights. Id.
62. An interesting illustration thereof is their respective handling of the issues concerning transfrontier broadcasting. The problem was regulated in the EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON TRANSFRONTIER TELEVISION (Television without Frontiers), March 15, 1989; and in
Directive 89/552/EEC on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation
or administrative action in member states concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting
activities, 1989 O.J. (L298) 23. The Convention has a strong cultural and human rights
bias, and was developed under the auspices of the Council of Europe. See Holznagel, The
European Convention on TransfrontierTelevision, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE FUNCTIONING
OF MEDIA IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 206-207 (Council of Europe ed. 1995); ALFONSO
SANCHEZ-TABERNERO, MEDIA CONCENTRATION IN EUROPE 206-207 (1993). The directive was
developed by institutions of the European Union, concentrating on broadcasting as a purely
commercial service. Most provisions of the Convention correspond to the Directive, the
main difference being the applicable method of enforcement. See also BoLLINGER, supra
note 18, at 46. "[T]he economic aspect of a free market and the democratic aspect of a free
marketplace of ideas are related and interconnected but not identical." Id.
63. TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (EEC) AND THE EuROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY (EURATOM), Rome, Mar. 25, 1957 (visited Apr. 16,
1998) <http://europa.eu.intlabc/obj/chrono/40years/7days/en.htm>.
64. This was explicitly recognized by the EU institutions. See Rideau, L'influence du
droit communautaire sur la protection des droits fondamentaux de la personne dans les
,tats-membres, DROIT COMMUNAUTAIRE ET PROTECTION DES DROITS FONDAMENTAUX DANS LES
ETATS-MEMBRES, 6-7 (L. Dubuis ed. 1995). For an overview of jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, see generally Voorhoof, supra note 61, at 42-43.
65. This was confirmed in the preamble of the EC Directive 89/552/EEC in which the
free distribution of television services is considered to be a specific application in community law of the freedom of expression as enshrined in Article 10 para. 1 of the ECHR. The
principle is confirmed as well in the new Treaty on the European Union (Maastricht, Feb.
7, 1994; amending the Treaties of Rome and the Single European Act so as to integrate the
existing Communities fully under the common framework of the EU. Title I, Article F(2)):
"[t]he Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention
for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms." Id.
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The most important provision for European free speech protection is
Article 10, ECHR. Its aim is to protect the right of everyone, regardless
of frontiers, to express himself, to seek and receive information and
ideas, whatever their source, as well as to impart them under the condi66
tions set out in the text of the article:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent states from requiring
the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in
a democratic society in the interests of national security, territorial
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for
the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information
received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
Article 10, ECHR provides the basis for media and information law
within the Council of Europe and its member states. It safeguards every
kind of expression, opinions, political speech, factual data and even commercial speech in all of its forms. 67 The protection of Article 10 is
equally applicable to information or ideas that offend, shock or disturb
the state or any sector of the population. 68 It is understood to cover all
technical means of communication. 69 As such, there is no need for any
additional legislation making free speech applicable to the information
superhighway.
Thus, freedom of speech is already protected on the information superhighway, at least in theory. However, given the democratic function
of free speech, there seems to be a practical problem. The fundamental
human right to freedom of speech should enable all citizens of a modern
democracy to speak freely to all others, who should in turn receive the
message without government interference. It is crucial for a democratic
society to cater to such a free flow of opinions and ideas, providing its
citizens with pertinent social and political information. The circulation
of such information currently happens by way of traditional media: the
printing press, radio and television. These are almost universally available to users but access to speakers is only granted on an arbitrary
66.

DECLARATION ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND INFORMATION OF THE COMMITTEE OF

29, 1982.
67. Voorhoof, supra note 61, at 35.
68. Handyside, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23 (1976).
69. Voorhoof, supra note 61, at 37-43. Meaning at least the press, radio, television,

MINISTERS, Apr.

cinema.
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70

base.
71
The information superhighway can offer a solution in this matter.
To a certain degree, the answer lies in the Internet. However, for the
information superhighway to fulfill its democratic function in society, an
indispensable condition is universal access to the network. People need
to have access to terminals and connections, and they need to receive the
appropriate education in order to use them. Only through universal ac72
cess will the information superhighway truly improve democracy.
The need for additional free speech legislation on the information
superhighway is related to the need for universal access. A growing gap
between the information rich and the information poor should be avoided
at all cost. 73 In the short term, legislative measures need to be enacted,
providing access to the information superhighway for every citizen at a
reasonable cost. Such a guarantee should be considered an extension of
the already existing universal service obligations in the telecommunications field. It should be noted that access to the Internet is already, at
least partly, an element of the universal service obligation as it exists in
70. Access for speakers to the printing press is possible by way of letters to the editor,
or by way of editorials. There is, however, no right to have them published. It is even more
complicated to gain access to radio and television stations. There is a limited right of reply
in cases where television transmissions constitute a personal attack or an intrusion into
private life. But there is no right to free broadcast of speech. See Article 8 Convention on
Transfrontier Television and Article 23 Directive 89/552/EEC. To users, all of these media
are easily accessible. Penetration of television receivers in households amounts to 99.4
percent of total households in the United States and 92.4 percent of total households in the
EU. See also ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 1997 COMMUNICATIONS OUTLOOK 1, 90. Personal Computers, however, only have a penetration rate
of 25.5 percent of the American households an average penetration of 20.4 percent in the

United Kingdom, Ireland, Spain, Netherlands, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium and Den-

mark;

ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC Co-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 1997 INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY OUTLOOK 1, 88.
71. MARTIN BULLINGER, KOMMvUNIKATIONSFREIHEIT IM STRUKTURWANDEL DER TELEKOM-

MUNIKATION, 65 (1980). In a broadcasting context the access of users was limited to the
receiving side. The information superhighway offers every user a double access to information sources, since he can act as a sender or as a receiver. In this respect, it is said to
promote democracy and increase the political participation of citizens. Id.
72. FINAL REPORT FROM THE HIGH LEVEL EXPERT GROUP ON THE SOCIAL AND SOCIETAL
ASPECTS OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY: BUILDING THE EUROPEAN INFORMATION SOCIETY FOR
Us ALL (1997). "Information access systems must be developed to be geared to the needs of

the entire population. In other words, remote-access information systems must be userfriendly, guarantee universal access, and enable individual enquiries." Id.

73. COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, Universal service for telecommunications in the perspective of a fully liberalised environment,
Brussels, 13.03.1996, COM(96)73 final. The European Commission is very aware of this
problem, taking into account the need to avoid a "two-tier society," divided between those
who have access to the new technologies and are comfortably using them and those who are
excluded from fully enjoying their benefits. Id.
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the EU. Indeed, universal service is comprised of, among other things,
the provision of voice telephone service via a fixed connection, which will
also allow a fax and modem to operate. This means that users are given
the possibility of accessing all services that can be provided over today's
telecommunications network, including the Internet. Provided, of
course, they have a computer and a subscription with an Internet service
74
provider.
All citizens should be able to express themselves freely through the
information superhighway in order for democracy to be complete. Unfortunately, abuses of free speech undermine democracy, and must be eliminated. That is why the right to freedom of speech was restricted from
the very moment western governments started protecting it. That is also
the reason why it should remain limited in the future. The question is to
what extent the original motives for restricting free speech still make
sense on the information superhighway. The answer to that question
should be the starting point for any further government intervention.
D.

RESTRAINTS ON UNDEMOCRATIC SPEECH

Despite great opposition, governments are currently attempting to
limit free speech on the Internet. This is actually not surprising, since
free speech has never been completely unrestricted. In the course of time
speech has been subjected to various restraints. An important category
of these speech limitations is studied in this section and concerns the
prohibition of undemocratic speech. In Europe, other free speech limitations exist which are related to the need for preserving the diversity of
media content. These are treated in the next section.
Freedom of speech is protected in order to safeguard and advance
the democratic ideal. Hence, it is clear, that the principle is not applied
to speech that fundamentally contradicts the basic egalitarian principles
and other values of a free and democratic society. 7 5 It might be stated as
a general rule that when forms of speech strike at the heart of values
deeply cherished in a free and democratic society, doctrinal space for regulation opens up. Indeed, certain expressions may, instead of helping to
realize the fulfillment of democracy, undermine or endanger that realization. Free speech may be restrained so as to protect public order: offences against public decency, insults to the head of state, and revealing
national or military secrets are all prohibited. Alternatively, certain expressions should be banned because they infringe subjective rights of individual people, for example, slanderous or libelous speech. Free speech
restrictions are part of media law, and were introduced at the very begin74. Id.
75. Gibbons, supra note 25, at 16. "In some cases, the protection of other rights maybe
more important than free speech." Id.
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ning of free speech regulation. They were later expanded on due to the
impact of radio and television messages on public opinion, and because of
the immediacy of the information disseminated over the airwaves.
Undemocratic speech is not favored by the courts. It has little (or
no) constitutional value and thus receives little (or no) constitutional protection. 76 On the contrary, undemocratic speech is prohibited and punished. Examples of undemocratic speech are expressions promoting
racial hatred, or hate speech in general. 77 The purpose of protecting minorities from the willful promotion of hatred against them is a constitu7s
tionally justifiable limitation on the freedom of expression.
Expressions causing (racial) hatred are clearly not contributing to the
principle of democracy. Hence, hate propaganda cannot be considered as
a legitimate form of speech.
A general framework for free speech restrictions in Europe is laid
down in Article 10, ECHR, which contains the general conditions for all
free speech restrictions, irrespective of the medium they are applied to.
According to the text, governmental restrictions to free speech are legitimate only if three cumulative conditions are fulfilled: state interferences
restricting free speech must be prescribed by law, they must serve a le79
gitimate purpose and they must be necessary in a democratic society.
Firstly, the restricting measure must be a statutory or regulatory text
qualified as law.8 0 The law in question needs to be transparent and precise enough for the citizen to be able to have an indication of the rules
applicable to the case and to foresee the consequences that may result
from a given action. 8 l Secondly, public authorities need to indicate the
aim of the restricting measure. The legitimate purposes are exhaustively enumerated in Article 10, ECHR. Thirdly, the restraints on free
speech are necessary in a democratic society. They need not be "indispensable," yet they should be more pressing than mere "normal" or "use76. Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Government Motive in
First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. Cm. L. REV. 413, 472 (1996).
77. BARENDT, supranote 22, at 10. "A society is arguably entitled to take the view that
for the foreseeable future racial harmony is such an important goal that an absolute tolerance of free speech is too great a luxury." Id.
78. Mahoney, supra note 75, at 803.
79. Voorhoof, supra note 61, at 56. "Ifone of these conditions is neglected, the restricting condition, rule or sanction with regard to the freedom of communication must be regarded as an infringement of Article 10 ECHR." Id. Moreover, all free speech restraints
must be applied without distinction. Any discrimination (e.g. based on nationality) in implementing a restrictive measure-even if conforming to the enumerated purposes-is
strictly forbidden. Id.
80. European Commission of Human Rights, X v. United Kingdom, 16 Eur. Comm'n
H.R. Dec. Rep. 32 (1979). See also European Commission of Human Rights, X v. Switzerland, 9 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. Rep. 40 (1978). The restricting rule need not necessarily be
a formal law, directly emanating from Parliament.
81. See, e.g., Sunday Times, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 31 (1979).
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ful" measures.8 2 Restrictions must not go beyond their legitimate
purpose, the proportionality doctrine being a fundamental element in the
Court's control mechanism. Every restriction to free speech should be
83
proportionate to its legitimate aim.
Article 10, ECHR is applicable to all media, including the information superhighway. Hence, restraints to free speech on the information
superhighway can be enacted as exceptions to the government's principal duty of non-interference. 8 4 Most free speech restraints take the form
of market access conditions or market behavioral rules. They are often
directed at the institutional players in the press, broadcasting and information markets.8 5 The market access rules are closely related to the
principle of ensuring diversity, and are treated in the next section. The
market behavior obligations prevent speakers from abusing their rights
which disrupt public order or injure other people's rights. Governments
may invoke these obligations to prevent hate speech, racist speech or
pornography on the Internet. Public authorities should, however, always
bear in mind that freedom of speech should not be curtailed arbitrarily.
Exceptions to the principle of freedom of expression must be narrowly
interpreted.8 6 The non-application of constitutional guarantees may not

82. Article 10, para. 2, ECHR. The member states have a certain discretionary power
here, however this power is not unlimited. Their exact margin of discretion depends on the
purpose of the restriction in question and on the restricted activity. Id. The legitimacy and
the proportionality of their interference are examined by the Commission and the Court.
Id.
83. Voorhoof, supra note 61, at 60-63 (extensively on the proportionality principle in
this respect). Therefore, the pursuit of the aims mentioned in Article 10, para. 2 has to be
weighed against the degree of interference with the applicant's freedom of expression. Id.
In case of disagreement or dispute, it is up to the national state to prove the need for free
speech limitation and to justify it in light of Article 10, para. 2 ECHR. The European Court
of Human Rights evaluates the government measures, taking into account the facts and
circumstances of the case. In judging which restrictions are admissible, the Court also
takes into consideration the particular situation of the person exercising the right of freedom of expression and the duties and responsibilities attached to that situation. See also
Hadjianastassiou v. Greece, 252 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 4 (1992).
84. If a government attempts to transpose these rules onto the information superhighway, it should first do what it has done with other new forms of communication: understand the technology intended to be regulated. See James D. Nahikian, Learning to Love
"the Ultimate Peripheral"--VirtualVices like "Cyberprostitution"Suggest a New Paradigm
to Regulate Online Expression, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 779, 784 (1996).
85. Nevertheless, note that some free speech restraints are directly imposed on the
individual citizen. For example, intellectual property legislation prohibiting citizens from
abusing the work of their fellow citizens, or the legislation concerning public decency and
public order.
86. See European Court of Human Rights, Sunday Times Judgement of April 26, 1979,
Publications of the European Court of Human Rights, Series A, vol. 30.
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reach beyond the purposes of these restrictions.8 7
Expressions clearly going against any of the fundamental principles
of free speech are never entitled to any legal protection. The ban on such
speech should be media-independent, extending itself to both old and
new media, including the information superhighway.8 8 In most jurisdictions, the ban on offensive speech is formulated in sufficiently general
terms. There is no need then for additional government interference in
this respect on the information superhighway. Other specific speech
bans which are linked to specific media can be extended by way of analogous legislative provisions to cover the Internet. In short, the same
speech restricting standards should apply to the information superhighway as are already applicable to other media.
Unfortunately, the complexity on undemocratic speech on the information superhighway is more complicated than that. This prohibition is
illustrated by some current legal difficulties with the Internet. The problem is that the Internet is a global communications network, while standards for intolerable speech are established on a regional or national
basis. The problem was apparent during the negotiations for the United
Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.8 9 Evidently, each state will apply its own values when regulating content and
services on the information superhighway. 90 Soft-core pornography, for
example, might be generally acceptable in the Netherlands, but is illegal
in Saudi-Arabia. Revisionist speech is forbidden by law in Germany, yet
it is permitted in California.
Each government has its own categories of prohibited speech, but if
such expressions are legal abroad, they can easily be made available
from there. The only solution seems to be an international harmonisation of minimum standards for unacceptable subject matters, as exists
87. Biullinger, supra note 71, at 60. Restrictions must be applied in a spirit of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness. Id.
88. Dawn L. Johnson, It's 1996: Do You Know Where Your Cyberkids Are? Captive
Audiences and Content Regulation on the Internet, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L.
51 (1996). Free speech protection always goes together with free speech restriction, even
on the newest media. Id. It should be mentioned that even if indecent, harmful, racist and
other undemocratic speech is available on the Internet, it is not there just for the taking.
An interested user has to make significant efforts to gain access to it. He or she must join
one of the respective newsgroups, search for the information required, pay for it, download
it, and possibly run a viewer to look at it. Unlike radio or television messages, the user
doesn't receive such messages without requesting them. This high degree of user control
should be taken into account when developing speech bans for the Internet or the information superhighway. Id.
89. See BOLLINGER, supra note 18, at 54. This wide international agreement has to be
applied to many states, each with a different concept of democracy.
90. See Crago, supra note 14, at 478-487 (discussing the problem of the jurisdiction of
European Member States to legislate, prescribe, and enforce their judgements concerning
Internet content).
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already for child pornography. There may not always be a need for additional legislative measures in order to ban undemocratic speech from the
information superhighway. However, governments should work together on the common legal framework needed to enforce such measures.
The enforcement of the ban on undemocratic speech is also complicated by other reasons. First, it is almost impossible to monitor all of the
communication circulating through the information superhighway, and
second, legal pursuits are difficult, particularly where the illegal
message originated abroad. 9 1 Traditional criminal lawsuits are bound to
fail when a speaker promoting child-pornography or neo-nazi theories is
residing abroad, is operating under a false name, is posting anonymously, or is hiding in seemingly uncontroversial newsgroups. A solution for this enforcement problem might be self-regulation. 9 2 On a small
scale, this implies that users who do not conform to a certain expected
behavioural standard are instantly excommunicated by their fellow surfers. Insiders call this process "Netiquette." Large scale self-regulation is
adopted by the market players themselves, having developed their own
codes of conduct. 93 Furthermore, experiments are being carried out with
points of contact. Users confronted with various degrees of pornography
or otherwise inappropriate materials on the Internet can report this by email to a local contact point. The service provider is then aware of the
illegal information, and obliged to remove it. Service providers cannot be
held responsible for the whole of the information circulating on their network but they are liable for knowingly displaying illegal information on
94
one of their sites.
Under very specific circumstances public authorities are allowed to
restrict free speech in order to protect the public order and other people's
rights. According to a European tradition, people need to have a broad
diversity of information at their disposal in order to be fully informed.
91. See Jongen, L'dvolution du droit depuis les Lumires: la libertd par l'Etat et contre
la presse?, LES M2DLAS ENTRE DROIT ET POUVOIR 67, 73 (B. Libois & G. Haarscher eds.

1995). See also Ethan Katsh, Rights, Camera, Action: CyberspatialSettings and the First
Amendment, 104 YALE L.J. 1681, 1713 (1995). New global media allow information to move
across borders at electronic speed, blurring all boundaries. The nation states-traditionally in control of physical boundaries-loose some ability to control communication that
might, quite literally, have been stopped at the border. Id.
92. See Crago, supra note 14, at 485 (describing CompuServe's reacting to the verdict
of a German court, which declared 200 sex-related Internet discussion groups illegal under
German law. CompuServe eliminated access to the groups for its four million members
world-wide).
93. Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Illegal and Harmful Content on the Internet
(visited Feb. 25, 1998) <http://www2.echo.lu/legal/en/internet/contentcommunic.html>
(describing the codes of conduct that have been set up in the United Kingdom, Germany,
the Netherlands and France).
94. Id. (concerning the responsibilities of access providers and host service providers).
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Hence, the government's role in safeguarding the freedom of speech has
gradually evolved into an active state interference preserving the diver95
sity of media content endangered by economic powers.

E.

SAFEGUARDING DIVERsITY

Free speech is protected because it is fundamental to democracy.
Western democracies presuppose an informed electorate. So, the information the user is provided with should reflect current social and political diversity. Such diversity was expected to emerge spontaneously in
the newspaper market, since there is no scarcity of infrastructure and
every citizen is free (at least in theory) to start up a new paper. However, in the broadcasting market a series of free speech restrictions were
enacted by European legislators in order to guarantee this plurality of
opinions. Diversity of media content was endangered by frequency scarcity and media concentrations. 96 In this section, we analyse the relevance of current free speech restrictions safeguarding the diversity of
media content on the information superhighway. Since there will be no
scarcity on the information superhighway, these restrictions may have to
be abolished.
1.

Frequency Scarcity

Frequency scarcity was the motive for a number of exceptions to the
freedom of speech principle in the broadcasting field. 97 These restraints
were needed for guaranteeing a well-organized use of the spectrum frequencies. 98 European states wanted to avoid the monopolistic or oligo95. Illustrative for this duty of care are the traditional press subventions and the former European broadcasting monopolies.
96. Voorhoof, supra note 35, at 57. See also Resolution of the Committee of Ministers
on Press Concentrations, Dec. 16, 1974 (stating that measures have to be taken in order to
assure media diversity and to prevent excessive media concentrations).
97. FRANQOIS JONGEN, LE DROIT DE LA RADIO ET DE LA T]L9VISION 32-33 (1989). See
BOLLINGER, supra note 18, at 44 (enumerating of the most important government measures
in this field in Europe). See also Holznagel, supra note 29, at 84. "Broadcasting liberty
necessarily supplements and reinforces freedom of opinion making; it serves the function of
guaranteeing free and comprehensive opinion formation through broadcasting." Id.
98. Note, The Message in the Medium: the FirstAmendment on the Information Superhighway, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1062, 1074 (1994). Note that the frequency scarcity rationale
and the regulatory edifice built upon it were aimed at minimizing viewpoint scarcity, given
the rights of viewers and listeners to receive a broad range of ideas. This is true for Europe
as well as the United States. But see McGinnis, supra note 15, at 110 (mentioning that the
scarcity rationale for regulation of transmission is far stronger in the newspaper context
than in the video programming market). "All physical goods, including newsprint, are
scarce. From a standpoint of pure economic efficiency, scarcity does not justify regulating
broadcasting any more than it justifies regulating newsprint." Id. An additional socialpolitical argument was found in the enormous possibilities provided by the new media to
influence public opinion, and in the immediate character of information dissemination by
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polistic control over the airwaves by private broadcasting corporations. 9 9
Private broadcasters were believed to endanger the diversity of information that citizens are entitled to. For years, national public broadcasting
monopolies throughout continental Europe have operated based on these
arguments. The monopolies were only broken down and replaced by licensing systems in the 1980s under pressure from the European Commission. Article 10, ECHR had already introduced a licensing system for
broadcasting, cinema, and television corporations. 10 0 This provision was
originally interpreted as indiscriminately authorizing public broadcasting monopolies.1 0 1 Today, the licensing measures under the first section
of Article 10 are subject to the general requirements of the second section
of Article 10.102 This provision is of little relevance to the Internet or the
information superhighway.
As such, public broadcasting monopolies or licensing systems do not
provide a solution to the scarcity problem. Diversity in broadcasted information is safeguarded by the doctrine of pluralism. 10 3 This policy
airwaves. See Purcell v. Ireland, App. No. 15404/89, 70 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 262
(1991), stating "the impact of radio and television is more immediate than that of the print
media, and the possibilities for the broadcaster to correct, qualify, interpret or comment
any statement made on radio or television are limited in comparison with those available
in the press." Id.
99. Such a situation would not be conducive to the public interest, as users would have
to pay high prices and access to the airwaves would be granted or refused arbitrarily. In
addition, the information the user would be provided with would run the risk of being onesided, coming from only one or two sources.
100. European Commission, Article 10, ECHR, para. 1. This provision was inserted for
practical reasons, e.g., the frequency scarcity or the major investments required for building transmitters.
101. European Commission of Human Rights, X v. Sweden decision of Feb. 7, 1968, Collection of Decisions of the European Commission of Human Rights, vol. 26.
102. See Groppera Radio AG v. Switzerland, 173 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 24 (1990)
(stating that the object and the purpose of the last sentence of Article 10 para. 1 and the
scope of its application must be considered in the context of article 10 as a whole, and in
particular in relation to the requirements of para. 2). Note that this provision remains
relevant in the light of state control over technical aspects, e.g. the allocation of frequencies. Still, it is increasingly difficult to defend national broadcasting monopolies from the
perspective of Article 10, para. 2. Under present day conditions, Article 10 may instead
become a legal argument against the maintenance of public broadcasting monopolies. See
Voorhoof, supra note 35, at 41.
103. Tony Prosser, David Goldberg & Stefaan Verhulst, The Impact of New Communications Technologies on Media Concentrations and Pluralism, study prepared at the request of the Committee of Experts on Media Concentrations & Pluralism of the Council of
Europe 42 (1996). "[Plluralism is understood to mean diversity of media supply." Id. Note
that the doctrine of pluralism is not accepted by everyone. One of the traditional free
speech philosophies-the argument from truth-aims at the elimination of difference
rather than protecting it. See McGinnis, supra note 15, at 59. Some regulators have declared that the public interest would best be served by free market forces. "[E]mpowering a
centralised authority to make decisions as to diversity . .. will threaten rather than in-
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goal claims that the current, socially present diversity is reflected in the
offer of information services. In short, pluralism is meant to increase the
diversity of the information available to the public.' 0 4 It is the responsibility of European states to ensure that such a plurality of opinions is
encouraged.' 0 5 The need for supplying the user with a diversity of interests and opinions prevails in the European tradition over the principle of
consumer sovereignty. 10 6 The relation of pluralism towards free speech
is ambiguous. On the one hand, pluralism unmistakably creates an obstacle to full freedom of speech. On the other hand, it contributes to the
presence of a broad range of social attitudes in the information the user
is provided with.' 0 7 Such diversity can be guaranteed through the obligation for one medium (the public monopolist) to have a plurality of opinions reflected in its communication activities (internal pluralism), or
through the existence of various independent and autonomous media
(external pluralism).' 0 8 The latter system is implemented in all Eurocrease the diversity of information . . . . There is no reason to believe that they will be
better at deciding what proportion of ideas should be transmitted on what pathway of the
net." Id. at 123. See also Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Bremmer, A Market PlaceApproach
to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207, 209-10 (1982), as cited by Rainey & Rehg,
supra note 45, at 1935. In any case, certain preconditions need to be fulfilled for safeguarding the democratic state while at the same time protecting pluralism. See also BOLLINGER,
supra note 18, at 52.
104. GREEN PAPER FROM THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION: PLURALISM AND MEDIA CONCENTRATION IN THE INTERNAL MARKET, COM(92)480 final.
105. See Informationsverein Lentia v. Austria, 276 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16 (1993).
106. See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1787. This was confirmed several times in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg and in policy documents of the
Council of Europe. See, e.g., Case C-288/89, Stichting Collectieve Antennevoorziening
Gouda v. Commissariaat voor de Media, 1991 E.C.R. 1-4007-4046; Case C-353/89, Commission v. Netherlands, 1991 E.C.R. 1-4069-4103. See also Voorhoof, supra note 35, at 56-57.
107. Even if the idea of pluralism is to be situated essentially within European media
law tradition, the United States Supreme Court has accepted the idea that a content-neutral effort to promote diversity may well be justified. "[A]ssuring that the public has access
to a multiplicity of information sources is a governmental purpose of the highest order, for
it promotes values central to the First Amendment," Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 663, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994). See also Associated Press v. United States,
326 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1945). The Supreme Court has recognised, in the context of print media
regulation, the need for government action designed to enhance the diversity and quality of
public affairs discourse.
108. Prosser, Goldberg & Verhulst, supra note 103, at 43. See GREEN PAPER FROM THE
EUROPEAN COMMISSION: PLURALISM AND MEDIA CONCENTRATION IN THE INTERNAL MARKET,

18 COM(92)480 final, supra note 104. See also Holznagel, supra note 29, at 86. More particularly external pluralism concerns the number of television and radio stations and the
number of people controlling them, while internal pluralism is related to the content of the
broadcast programmes; COUNCIL OF EUROPE STEERING COMMITTEE ON THE MASS MEDIA:
CONSULTANT STUDY ON THE IMPACT OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMO-

CRATIC VALUES, 16 CDMM(95); SANCHEZ-TABERNERO, supra note 62, at 228-235 (describing

the different means for encouraging pluralism put into practice by European States).
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pean states through the enactment of various market access rules.
Market access rules may vary from a system of free admission (for
example, printing press), to a declaration regime (for example, Internet
service providers) or a licensing system (for example, broadcasting organizations). 10 9 Market access rules apply to the information superhighway even if there is little or no question of scarcity. Carriers need to
fulfill the usual conditions of telecommunications law, mostly license obligations. Service providers are subject to a particular declaration
regime.
The information superhighway is a hybrid network, using a combination of different carriers: telephone lines, television cables and wireless connections, analogue or digital. There should be no scarcity on
these networks, every user will have his message transmitted or
downloaded, and a plurality of opinions will be available. During the
current transition period, pluralism remains safeguarded on radio and
television, hence the electorate is sufficiently "informed." There seems to
be no immediate need for additional state interference to ensure pluralism on the information superhighway. This may change, however. It is
expected that the transmission of radio and television programmes will
be fully integrated in the information superhighway. The consumption
of this information will take place in a growing interactive way. Users
will only receive the programmes they ask for. In those circumstances,
the market alone may not be able to guarantee full diversity. Then a
new form of pluralism might be needed.
The transposition to the information superhighway of existing free
speech regulation ensuring pluralism is far more complex than the
transposition of legislation prohibiting undemocratic speech. It is unclear if democracy can still be guaranteed on the information superhighway, when equal access to a minimum package of information that is
representative of all social and political tendencies in society, including
109. In this respect a distinction needs to be made between the production market and
the transmission market. The production market can be defined as the market where (electronic) information services are produced. Access thereto is free for the printing press (the
publishing of a new title), broadcasters generally need a license. The procurement of
databases for the public over electronic networks is free. Different carriers (operators of
terrestrial airwaves, cable and satellite links) offer their network services to the information providers at the transmission market. Nearly all European transmission markets
have a monopolistic or oligopolistic structure. The frequency spectrum was originally
under complete control of national broadcasting monopolies but since the eighties, private
radio and television stations have gradually been allowed to use the spectrum for the
broadcasting of their programs. The dismantlement of the de facto monopoly of television
cable operators has not started yet, although nothing prevents potential operators from
applying for a license. The transmission of on-line services can be undertaken by any interested carrier. See generally KPMG, PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES ARISING FROM TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND AUDIOVISUAL CONVERGENCE,

216 (1996).
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minority opinions, is not guaranteed to every citizen. This is especially
relevant when radio and television programmes will be integrated into
the information superhighway to such an extent that they are no longer
broadcast in the traditional manner. Some authors believe that it is the
responsibility of the state to provide a minimal amount of information:
this is called "universal service with content." 1 10
It seems that during this transition period the current market access rules must remain in force, in order to have diversity ensured on
radio and television. When the information superhighway is fully completed, a new form of pluralism may need to then be implemented. Additional measures might be necessary, since the diversity of information
the electorate is provided with is not only endangered by a shortage of
frequency spectrum, but also by the growing media concentrations and
alliances.' 1 1
2. Media Concentrations
There is a strong belief in Europe that the market alone never guarantees diversity nor quality in news reporting or the dissemination of
information. 1 12 This is especially true on the information superhighway.
Its expansion involves increased tendencies of vertical integration and
concentration of media ownership. 1 13 Indeed, the development of digital
infrastructure and services is associated with great investments, forcing
media and telecommunications corporations to increase their profitabil110. Yves Poullet, Jean-Paul Triaille, Francois Van Der Mensbrugge & Valerie Willems,
Convergence between Media and Telecommunications: Towards a New Regulatory Framework, 11 COMPUTER L. & SEC. REP. 174, 179 (1995). But see Nicholas Garnham, Telecommunications and Audio-Visual Convergence: Regulatory Issues, 12 COMPUTER L. & SEC.
REP. 284, 285 (1996).
111. This makes it possible for the same economic group to take control over a number
of information channels (with the risk of private censorship), or for certain media to disappear or merge, thereby reducing the sources of information. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE
STEERING COMMITTEE ON THE MASS MEDIA: CONSULTANT STUDY ON THE IMPACT OF NEW

HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIC VALUES, 15 CDMM(95). Media concentrations and alliances are encouraged by the development of new media industries (cable
and satellite television, teletext and videotext services), the ending of broadcasting monopolies and the increase in advertising revenue. See also SANCHEZ-TABERNERO, supranote 62,
at 5-7. Concentration of media markets in this respect is defined as "an increase in the
presence of one or a handful of media companies in any market as a result of various possible processes: acquisitions, mergers, deals with other companies, or even the disappearance
of competitors."
112. See generally GREEN PAPER FROM THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION: PLURALISM AND MEDIA CONCENTRATION IN THE INTERNAL MARKET, COM(92)480 final.
113. Gillian Doyle, The Cross Media Ownership Debate, 16 MEDIA L. & PRACTICE, 38-43
(1995). These integration and concentration tendencies even seem to be encouraged by the
European Commission, always stressing that the expansion of the information superhighway will depend on private investment. Id.
TECHNOLOGIES ON
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ity and to concentrate on commercial competition. Carriers and content
providers realize that in order to be successful they must pursue alli1 14
ances, mergers and joint ventures with their former competitors.
The emergence of mighty media concerns gaining control over media
1 15
markets can be as dangerous for free speech as government control.
These intersectorial corporations may become so dominant as to push
other potential speakers out of the market, giving rise to a lack of diversity and to private censorship. Higher access prices and information
costs will be the result, and as a consequence the information superhighway will be preserved for the elite. 1 16 Contemporary media tycoons may
pretend to be the greatest proclaimers of the traditional free press doctrine, but they only use the free speech argument in order to protect their
own monopolistic situation and to inhibit the free speech rights of
others. 117 They have the ability to take control of one or several media
markets without regard to the importance of free speech as a basic, inalienable, human right of every citizen. 1 18
114. Karel Van Miert, Mapping the New Open Telecommunications Marketplace, (visited July 7, 1997) <http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg04/speech/seven/en/sp97034.html>. Indeed, investors in the telecommunications network also have a clear interest in acquiring
interests in content providers. "We have seen some gigantic partnerships, agreements and
mergers spring up in Europe and the rest of the world, and this trend will continue: on the
one hand between alternative or complementary networks, on the other between the content producers and packagers of information and the carriage networks." Id. See Mark L.
Gordon & Diane J.P. McKenzie, A Lawyer's Roadmap of the InformationSuperhighway, 13
J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 177, 185 (1995). This repositioning of media markets
is not surprising, for new speed and power are incompatible with existing spatial and social
arrangements. New media are not just additions to the old ones, nor do they leave the old
ones in peace. Instead, they never cease to oppress the older media until they find new
shapes and positions for them, See also McLuHAN, supra note 5, at 174.
115. BARENDT, supra note 22, at 83 (stating that in certain cases there is no real difference between state censorship and private censorship exercised by editors and journalists).
Private censorship may well constitute as serious a danger to free speech as state control.
Id.
116. Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1762-3. "There is no logical a priori connection between
a well-functioning system of free expression and limitless broadcasting or Internet options." Id.
117. Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 18, at 1735. Indeed, "if the past is prologue,
entrenched private interests will use public policy to achieve their goals of limiting competition." Id. See also Voorhoof, supra note 35, at 59. The conglomeration of power in national or transnational multimedia consortia can pose a threat to the freedom of expression
of others, and to freedom of information of the public. Id.
118. Gibbons, supra note 25, at 20. Indeed, "the excessive concentration of media power
is likely to restrict the seeking and imparting of information and thereby inhibit democratic discussion." Id. An interesting illustration of this is the European newspaper market. Fusions, concentrations and joint-ventures have drastically reduced the number of
independent newspaper titles over the last 30 years. It is very difficult to launch new initiatives in a concentrated market. There has been very little new print media developed
over the last 20 years. Also, most of them have disappeared almost at once, or have been
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Such occurances should be avoided on the information superhighway. The state has an active role to play in the protection of free speech,
endangered as it is by private groups. It is the government's responsibility to secure pluralism and a diversity of media sources and access.
Therefore, concentrations and alliances between carriers and content
providers are subject to competition law and to media ownership restrictions. Diversity is further safeguarded through various active policies
concerning frequency management and press subventions. It is the ultimate challenge for public authorities to preserve a minimum of state
neutrality in the course of these actions. 1 19 This increasing state control
is perceived by the affected corporations as significantly diminishing
120
their speech and press freedoms.
IV. CONCLUSION
The technological revolution now going on in the communications
sector is of almost as great a magnitude and scale as the advent of the
telephone system. A number of regulatory problems are likely to
emerge, unless proactive government action and industry self regulation
occur soon. 12 1 Part of the problems will directly and indirectly be related
to free speech. It seems that even if the information superhighway is far
from "finished," a few conclusions can already be drawn as to the role of
free speech legislation on the new medium.
We assumed in the introduction to this article that the role of free
speech is the same on all media, including the information superhighway. New communications technologies would not give rise to new legal
questions, and therefore, there would be no immediate need for additional legislative measures concerning free speech on the information superhighway. The starting point for any new legislation should be the
original motives for protecting and restricting free speech. Understanding the regulation of older communications media offers guidance for developing new, contemporary rules. 1 22 That is why we began by
discussing the protection of free speech in the past, before concluding
integrated into the great concerns. The same trend is occuring in the audiovisual sector.
Berlusconi controls the entire Italian media market, and Canal+ is growing all over
Europe.
119. RiCHARD ABEL, SPEECH AND RESPECT 44-46 (1994).
120. See SCHAUER, supra note 16, at 122. Hence the ambivalence of the current press
subventions: essentially intended to increase the freedom of expression, they seem as well
symptomatic of the growing lack of press independence. In fact, the state has the press
under control by threatening the withdrawal of subsidies.
121. See Ilene K. Gotts & Alan D. Rutenberg, Navigatingthe Global Information Superhighway: a Bumpy Road Lies Ahead, 8 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 275, 277 (1995).
122. Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 18, at 1725. "Past complaints will be prologue
for future complaints about what creators place on, and users receive from, the infobahn."
Id.
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with the role of free speech legislation for information superhighway
23
purposes. 1
Free speech is protected because it is an indispensable instrument
for democracy. That goes for free speech on the information superhighway as well, especially given the actual growth of the global network.
The principle as such is not affected by the rise of successful new technologies. Still, even if current free speech regulation is highly relevant for
application to the information superhighway, a number of legislative
amendments are indispensable.
As to the additional legislative measures for protecting free speech
on the information superhighway, universal access for all citizens should
be guaranteed. It is the responsability of European states to provide access to the information superhighway for all their inhabitants. Indeed,
Article 10 of the ECHR is applicable to all technical means of communication, including the information superhighway. And following Article 1
of the ECHR, member states should take care that the freedom of expression is secured for everyone within their jurisdiction. This means that
member states should secure access to the information superhighway
from the moment it has developed sufficiently to become the main instrument for spreading ideas, opinions and information. A number of European states have already installed public access points in schools and
libraries.
The protection of democracy requires free speech to be limited to a
certain extent. That is the reason why undemocratic speech is illegal
and why the diversity of media content is explicitly safeguarded in Europe. States applying these current restraints to the information superhighway are in no way acting illegally. Free speech should indeed
remain restricted on any new media. Therefore, a number of additional
governmental interferences may be required. Undemocratic speech
should be forbidden on the information superhighway, if it is not already.
For efficiency, this prohibition should preferably be designed according to
international harmonized standards. The time has come for public authorities of the different states to start negotiating on the exact content
of these standards and for a unified procedure in the pursuit of
infringers.
The diversity of media content is especially protected in Europe. It
remains guaranteed in the traditional media by way of pluralism rules.
The information superhighway may become the overall medium for the
transmission of any information, including newspapers, television
programmes and video games. At that point, a new form of pluralism
may be needed, to the extent that sufficient diversity will not be provided
123. Id. "Past complaints will be prologue for future complaints about what creators
place on, and users receive from, the infobahn." Id.
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for automatically by the market. Future free speech legislation for the
information superhighway should therefore guarantee a minimum package of diverse information to be provided to each user at a reasonable
price. At the same time, regulatory bodies on a national and European
level should supervise concentrations and alliances between corporations
on the information market, so that they do not endanger diversity and
pluralism.
Originally, free speech was guaranteed mostly through the governmental duty of abstention. Any interference with individual speech was
illegal. In the meantime, the state's responsibilities in this respect have
evolved into a positive duty of care. 124 It is its duty to provide for a full
and effective freedom of speech for all its inhabitants. Legislation within
the framework of this duty of care seems to increase due to the rise of the
information superhighway. There is a need for universal access rules,
for a new form of pluralism and potentially for more anti-concentration
legislation. Creative solutions in all these fields should be discussed and
decided on now, while the information superhighway still is in its infancy. Control over change consists in moving not with change, but
ahead of it.125

124. BOLLINGER, supra note 18, at 68. An inherent conflict between both governmental
functions characterizes the ambiguous role of the state. In exercising its duty of care the
government, by definition, infringes its duty of abstention, endangering free speech while
at the same time safeguarding it. The supervision of media concentrations is illustrative in
this respect. Incapable of abstaining and interfering at the same time, the state should
avoid interference in principle and act only when indispensible for preserving the freedom
of speech. "The legitimacy of restrictions on freedom to impart information by the press
should be weighed against the public's right to be informed. The same prudent approach
needs to prevail in the Member States." Id. See also Voorhoof, supra note 35, at 59.
125. McLuHAN, supra note 5, at 199.

